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This paper proposE'S that emulation techniqups can be a solution to a difficulty arising in the 
analysis of the rel iabil ity of highly re1 iable computer systems for future cOlTlllercial aircraft, and thus 
should warrant investigation and development. 
The papetO first establishes the difficulty, viz., the lack of credible precision in reliability 
estimates otJtained by analytical modeling techniques. The difficulty is shown to be an unavoidable 
consequence of: (1) a high reliabil ity requirement so d(:manding as to make system evaluation by use 
testing infeaslble, (2) a complex system design technique, fault tolerance, (3) system rel iabil ity 
dominated by errors due to flaws in the system definition, and (4) elabotOate analytical modeling tech-
niques whose precision outputs are quite sensitive to errors of approximation in their input data. 
Next, the technique of emulation is described, indicating how its input is a simple description of 
the logical structure of a system and its output is the consequent behavior. Use of emulation techniqu 
is discussed for "pseudo-testing" systems to evaluate bounds on the parameter values needed for the 
analytical techniques. 
Finally an illustrative example is presented, albeit for a fanciful small scale application, to 
demonstrate from actual u~e the promise of the proposed application of emulation. 
1 NTRODUCTI ON 
Research efforts are underway to develop more efficient civil transport aircraft for the future. One 
facet of the effort involves active control technology which impl ies greater rel iance upon computer 
systems in order to obtain maximum benefits. This paper discusses the need and justification of develop-
ment and investigation of emulation techniques as adjuncts to theoretfcal reliability analysis models of 
fault tolerant avionic computer systems. 
REQUIRE~~NT FOR FAULT TOLERANCE 
Designs of fault tolerant computer systems have arisen in response to anticipated needs of future 
civil aircraft (Bjunnan, B. E. et a1., 1976), (Hopkins, A. L. et a1., 1978), (Wensley, J. H. et a1., 1978) .. 
Requirements for rel iabil ity of systems and associated components have been inferred from the expression 
"extremely impr~baDle" in regulatory documentation pertaining to safety in corrmercial transport aircraft 
(FAA, 1970). The following, variously worded, infonnal statements indicate the range of interpretations: 
"Thus we have a rel iabil ity requirement of 10-8 per hour of operation for a level 1 or level 2 
function with no lnternal or external backup ... " * (Ratner, R. S. et a1., 1973) 
", •• a number less than or equal to 1x10-9 has been imposed .•. to represent the probability of 
an event designated as extremely improbable. ..• Loss of the CCV/FBW function, given a fault-
free system at dispatch, shall be extremely improbable." ** (Bjunnan, B. E. et al., 1976) 
" •.. the computer's failure rate will be designed belJw 10-9 failures per hour in flights of up 
to ten hours duration, ~lith a preferred goal of 10-10 failures per hour." (Smith, T. B. et a1., 
1978) 
..... the extrapolated failure of the design in context ,lith production system application shall 
not exceed 10-9 computer-related system failures in flights up to ten hours." (sic) (NASA. 1978) 
As an a'/erage of the interpretations, and for discussion purposes, an equally informal statement is 
adopted here as the requirement, viz., 
the probability that a system containing no failed components at the start of operation will 
fail during the first ten hours of operation ~lill 'le less than approximately 10-9 
in which the tenn "failed components" refers, in a cOllvcntion~l manner, to failures caused by physical 
defects occurring randolilly in time, and in which a system is· considered to have failed when it has not 
correctly performed the function required of it as a sul)system in it larger, encompassing system. 
Temporarily disregarding failure5 due to causes external to systP.f115 or to inadequately or incorrectly 
designed and implemented systems. one can determine that, in ord~r to satisfy tht! rel iabil ity requirL1ncnt, 
a compuler system constructed of del'ices (in turn constructed of more bdsic components) with independent 
*Levels pertain to criticality Df functions. 
**CCV/FBW = control configured v('hicle / fly by vtire. 
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failur,' tfi:.tt iouti(Jns ""d conc(d"t failu"l' I'dte', wnuitf ,equir(', if it W2re intolerant of the f.1ilure of any of it~ constitu"nt d"vict's, a III<'Jn tillle to faililre (mTr) of appro<illiltely tpn fllllion (lOW) f,ours for tt,£, ICd"~ relidhle of till' lkvices. Such ,1 systelll is unlikely to sec the li9ht of dclY in the n,'<lr futurl', to ~cly the ICJst, sincc r('nlistic, avaiL,blf> 1,~vicl's such as processor's, "'C'IIIOt'if's, etc;, fro:n which 'ystl"'S Ciln be con~.truct('ll, do not hJve ~uch 1('l1gthy NTTF's; v,llues in the rall<Je frolll 102 to 105 are more rcasull-Iblc. Consequently, CQ,ilputl'r systems intcnued to satisfy the reI iabil ity r('quin~l1lent have been designed to ~.o,1.~~iI_tS, fdilul'cs. 
Several characteristics of fault tolerance give risc to a need to examinc expl icitly the reI iabil ity impl icat ions of a fail urc nrode conventiona lly handled impl icitly by testing actua I system~. 
One rather obvious charactC'ristic of a fault tolerant system is redundancy of components -- at the very least wher, in an iniUal condition free of failed compolH'nts. [n the case of systems \~ith require-ments for reliability stated in tenns of the first few hours or a small fraction of expected equipment lifetimes, the characteristic implies renewal activities which \~ill be often repeated. While sOllie form of verification that systems arc still in a (perceived) fault-free condition will be a minimum rene-.al activity, the MTTF's of rNlistic, avionic devices insure thilt a not insignificant amount of repair' activity ;~ill also be nep.ded -- to return systems to the fauit-free, initial condition needed to fulfill .the assumptions underlying the reI iabil ity estimates. The characteristic further suggests, other things unchanging, that the more "multifunction" the constituent devices are, the more efficient Ule systems are in terms of totill equipillent used and maintained. Therefore, there is an economic pressure for designs utilizing nrultifunction devices such as Mic~oprocessors with software. However, a cost is incurred in a different coin, i.e., greater complexity in the synthesis, logic and analysis of systems with parallel and/or intersecting signal and data paths and time-shared use of resources and algorithms. 
Another necessary characteristic of a fault tolerant system is its possession of an agent or mechanism capable of detecting failures in devices or components and utilizing available redundancy to nullify failures. This characteristic may be accomplished in a passive manner when some convenient property Df nature permits -- a simple eXaml)le is parallel rather than series wiring of Christmas tree lamps to avoid an open circuit failure caused by one defective lamp -- or, as appears rrlore likely to be necessary in com-plex systems, in an active manner by the addition to a redundant system of still more devices and/or logic to act as detectors and nullifiers. Of course, a price is paid again in increased complexity. 
There is a notion which merits a few words as it occaSionally arises at this point. The notion is that the reI iabil ity requirement is unnecessarily stringent, as witnessed by the ten bill ion (l010) hour MTTF previously cited. However, that value was for a fault intolerant system, a "series" system, and is inappropriate as an approximation of the MTTF of a fault tolerant system of equivalent reliability at an extremely early stage of its expected operation, i.e., ten hours, for one reason because the variance of time to failure of fault tolerant systems tends to be 'mUCh less than that of series systems. For example, Figure 5 compares the failure density distribution of two systems having the same mean (i.e., same MTTF). Density A is a series system. Density B is a representation (specifically a 2 out of 5) of a parallel redundant system. Clearly, at an early stage in their operation, the parallel system has a greater relia-b1li ty. A better approx ima t ion is provided by the MTTF of sys tenrs composed of severa 1 r-out-of-n sub-systems (i.e., n parallel, identical devices of which r must be operating for the subsystem to be operating) in series. A system consisting of a Single r-out-of-n-subsystem serves as a reasonable upper-bound estimate of the MTTF of a fault tolerant system when the representative constituent device chosen is the fault tolerant system's "worst" (i.e., the device type with the greatest MTTF in the set of constituent devices whose functions cannot be performed by any combination of the other device types of the system; a processor would be in this set). Assuming, as before, that constituent devices have independent failure distribu-tions and constant failure rates, one can show that an r-out-of-n system has a mTF not very much different from that of its constituent device, and quite 1 ikely less because of factors accounted for by "coverilge". Figure 1 contains a simplified behavior model of an r-out-of-n system. Each state corresponds to a set of possible configurations hilving a stated nvmher of operating constituent devices. The transition rate out of a state is the appropriate multiple of the constant failure rate, A, of one device. Since, given the occurrence of a component failure, a successful transition to another operating state of less redundancy is problematical, so-called "coverage" parameters, Ci, conditional probabilities of successful transition given a failure, are included. Unsuccessful transition is assumed to mean inrmediate system failure. Usually the coverage parameters are associated with systems having active recovery processes, but they are also applicable to passive mechanisms as long as there are transitions ~Jhich can go a~lry among distin-guishable, operating states. No distinction is made here. Recognizing this model and assumptions as a Markov process, one can develop the appropriate differential equiltions for the stochastic process (Feller, W., 1966) and determine in a straightforward manner that the probability of system failure is represented by the expression 
where aO = 
n-r 
1 - e- nAt 1: aj(~)(eH - 1)j 
j=O J 
and aj = fr Ci for j = 1, 2, ... , (n-r). i=1 
Ratios of system 1-1TTr to constituent device MTTF are tabulat"d for various combinations of values of ,r:, !'1_, and Ci in Tobles 1 and 2. III T"ble I, Ci =) for illl J_, implyinq th,lt coverd<JC is perfect. Althou')h the ratios are illdependent of the con~tituent device'~ failurp. rate (or equivillently, MTTf'l, not all co,,,billo1tions of rand n are useful, 'liven a ~pecific device failure rate, when the 10-9 requiremellt 1s con,idercd. For fr,·stancc, a device ~lith I1lTF le~~ th<H1 lOP II()ur~ could he u~ed to construct sy~te"'s of zones p~1 and lower l>ut not ZOllr,,, p or hif]frl'r:-·'f10re ~pecifiLally a devic(~ with InTF of five thousand (5-.103) 'h-o'ul's would not be used to cOllstruLl sy~tetns of zonps 4 arrd 5. In Tablp. 2, Cl = 0.9 and Ci = 0.1 
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for all i; I, ~Ihich is excessively pOOl' coverage since systeHls are all in zones 901' higher. In all' 
cases in both t,ln 1 rs. thc I'd t ios do not differ frolll 1 loy illl order of maglli tude. lIence, to the ex tent that 
fault toler.lnt systems Jl'C rcpresentc'''-'by r-out-of-n"systellls, a simple Mid reasonable Jpproximation to the 
MTTr's of such ~ystf'IIIS aplwars to be silllply the NTTf of the "\~orst" device type, il filr cr," from the tc'n 
billion (lu10 ) hour value. 
However, having identified a better approximation to MTTF for fault tolerant systems, it is well to 
note that, in tM application of interest, the systl'ms will be effectively rcne\~ed every ten' hours or so. 
Hence mH. in the conventional sense of an unrenewed system used until sy~tem failure as computed above. 
is not descriptive of system usc. In order to consider the l'elationship of the reliability requirement to 
safety, it is more meaningful to estimate the probability of system failur('s. to be considered e''iergency 
situations, during the lifetime of a fleet of aircraft with realistic policies for renewal. Therefore, 
assuming (1) systems meetill9 the 10-9 requirement when all, failure modes are cOII!jidered, (2) sy:;tem 
renewal aft['r every ten hours of operation. and (3) a fleet of two thousand (2,10 ) aircraft each with a 
lifetime of sixty thousand (6'<104) hours. the probability is approximately 0.01 that one or more emergency 
situations will OCCJr because of a computer sy,tem. It is a matter of judgment, no doubt tempered by 
economics, whether or not <lny greater risk to safety is acceptable. Indeed this estimate docs not con-
sider latent failures. i.e., conditions where physical defects have occurred but have not yet contributed 
to a data error because the failed components have not been party to a computation. Such a mechanism could 
be modeled dS an aging effect on the systems -- despite periodic renewals -- indicating that the value 0.01 
above is optimistic. And this computation has not included any manner of conSidering increased complexity 
as !. and !!. vari ed. 
Ironically the increased complexity, while ostensibly contributing to a reduction in the incidence of 
system failures resulting from component and device failures, is a source of residual "definitional flaws" 
in systems. The term "definitional flaw" is adopted here to denote an inadvertent system design which, 
when the system is in some particular condition with some unexpected data and regardless of the presence 
or absence of ~onventional component failures or anomalous environments, produces undesirable results which 
could have been avoided by another, proper design; the term includes design errors, specification errors 
or inadequacies, missing requirements. etc. It matters not whether the flaw is in software or hardware or 
is the result of the correct implementation of an erroneous or incomplete specification; the root cause i3 
human error. One expects the inCidence of such flaws to i;lcrease with grllwth in complexity. There is a 
quite large pool of practical experience with such a failure mode -- everyone's 'betes noires', the ~oft­
ware bugs found in operational software systems -- which indicates strongly that the failure mode must be 
included, in some fashion, in the reliability analysis of complex systems. On the other hand, in the 
avionic application of interest, the level of system reliability required effectively precludes the use 
of thorough, lifetime/use testing of actual systems to dete~line with acceptable confidence (in a 
statistical sense) that the probability of system failure due to residual definitional flaws is compatible 
with the reliability goals and requirement. As a consequence, more analytical methods -- for example 
(Costes. A. et al., 1978) -- must be developed and relied upon to address total system (i.e., logic, 
largely software, and hardware) reI iabil ity -- with "acceptable credibil ity". 
TECHNIQUES FOR ADDRESSING DEFINITIONAL FLAWS 
Analogously to "hardware redundancy", techniques for designing systems with "logical redundancy" to 
(attempt to) prevent system failures attributable to residual definitional fla~ls are becoming a subject of 
research -- and cevelopment. The software fault tolerance studies at the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne 
are a leading example of recent innovations (Randell, B., 1975). Largely as a result of the sequential 
nature of software algorithms, fault tolerant software has been oriented more to a method of sequential 
test and selection, in accordance with stated acceptance criteria, from among alternate algorithms in a 
software system. rather than to a method of comparison and voting over the results of a number of alternate 
algorithms. But parallel alternate hardware logic or concurrent alternate software algorithms in parallel 
processors are conceivable mechanizations. The "logical redundancy" techniques are therefore seen to 
parallel hardware. 
Fault tolerant software lends itself to an especially simple behavior mOdel, as in Figure 2(a), on 
the assumption that successful recovery from a softrlare (or logic) failure impl ies ilTlTlediate return to the 
initial (software) state. The rationale for the assumption is that the flaw responsible for the software 
data error has always been present in the system. having merely not been previously activated, so to speak; 
the system remains ready to function as before (i.e., correctly) once it has survived the software data 
error. Indeed. one might expect to not see a second, identical software error, assuming the initial error 
to have been triggered by unusual d<lt~not likely to soon be seen again. (As an aside, experiments using 
the emulation technique to be discussed suggest themselves to determine whether or not software data errors 
might not better be modeled as error "bursts".) Figure 2(b) is a simpler representation of the same 
recovery/failure process. Again, for the sake of simplicity, software is assumed to have a constilnt 
failure rate, I'. and fault tolerant software is assumed to have an aggregate recovery parameter, k. 
analogous to the coverage parameters of the r-out-of-n hardr/are .nodel. Inunediate system failure is assumed 
to be the result of lack of successful recovery. rio further elaboration of a software model is attempted 
since there has been no credible empirical evidence available for the selection and justification of any 
particular, more complex, general model of system failure due to software (Thibodeau, R., 197B), let alone 
the more general CJoe of residual definitional flaws. 
ANALYTIC RELIABILITY ANALYSIS: HOW CRED'-~LE? 
The software model of Figure 2 and the r-out-of-n model of Figure 1 suffice, however, to show the 
difficulty, when lifetime-usc testing of actual systons is not feasible. of establishing with acceptable 
confidence (in the ~t.)tistical sense) that systems designed to satisfy the 10-9 requironent do achieve the 
reliability goal. In Figure,3, the two models arc comhined to represent simply a system suhject to and 
tolerant of both h~rdware cOIIIPonent fililurc~ and errors due to residual dp.fillitional flaws (here. software). 
An additional assulIIPtion is made -- thdt the software and hardware are independent -- to keep the 
,. 
\. 
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111usl""liUJl simplc arpin, It is I'0ssible to adr! nlO"l' cC""plexity in the model. but ,15 stilted Lefore, therc 
h 110 cflIpil"ical cvidcn·;c to justify selectillg any p.)I'lirul,tr lIIodel in prete".,nc" to Jnotl:l'r. IIlso, tI·(' 
conclu~i()11 below is not appreciably lIIodified. Again 1'('CO~llIizill9 the model amI assumptions as J Ndrkov 
pl'Ocess, the probability of systL~n fdilun~ is computcd to he 
where aO and aJ are as before. 
For a typical (and optimistic) value for ). (::::10-4 failures per hour), typical values for n (::::3 to 5) 
and the required value for! (=10 hours), bounds on CI , C2 , .. nd lJ(l - k) required, in order for the 
systelll to satisfy the 10-9 requirement, are calculated to be as follows: 
1 ~ Cl ~ 0.999999 
1 ~ Cz ~ 0.9999 
There appears to be little margin for error ill designing systems to satisfy the 10-9 requirement. Refine-
ment of the model cannot eliminate the difficulty in estimating precisely the reliability of such systems; 
it can only transform it into a need for near p~rfect knowledge of different parameters. for the systems 
~st still.achieve the same aggregate behavior as above. . , 
MORE COMPLEX MODELS 
In the process of investigating fault tolerant systems (previously. principally studies of hardware) 
numerous models have been developed for analyzing the reliability of such systems. Of late. inveitigations 
have also been undertaken into models to relate the system failure modes to time-variable COlnputational and 
performance requirements. thus attaching the reli~bility of a system more·tightly to its application 
(Heyer. J., 1977). (Beaudry. ii. D •• 1978). Svrne model evaluation schemes have been "computerized" to 
serve as more or less general purpose tools for the convenient analysis. in the architectural design stage. 
of systc~s composed of complex arrangements of elements, e.g., CAST (Cohn, R. B. et al., 1974). CARE II 
(Stiffler. J .• 1974). CARSRA (Bjurman. B. E. et·al •• 1976). ARIES (N9. Y •• 1976). Although they consider 
details of system behavior such as recovery (detection. isolation. reconfiguration) strategies. sparing 
(active. stand-by. switching) strategies, transient and intermittent fault (duration. periodicity. leakage) 
modes, functional dependence a~ng devices. nonexpor.ential failure distributions. etc., the models still 
are constructed essentially from parawetric descriptions of aggregate system. subsystem and/or device 
behavior in order to make use of mathematical techniques applicable to idealized stochastic process models 
and for reasonably effiCient computation. Hence all the models ~ust be provided with parameter values 
which need to be assumed or known. by some other means. in order to precisely represent any ilnd each 
particular system design of interest. . 
EMULATION 
Digital Simulation 
While the word "simulation" is widely used to denote all manner of techniql'es for, among other 
purposes! analyzing the behavior of objects and their environments by means of implementation and manipu-
lation of more conveniently malleable surrogates. here the ~lOrd is limited to mean the use of computer 
·systems" as surrogates -- at whatever leVel of abstra~tion is meaningful to an application. The concept 
of system is stressed because usefulness of a simulation scheme depends upon both softl1at"e and hardware --
a characteristic more effectively utilized by emulatic.n. For example, consider the reI iability analysis 
programs previously mentioned -- CAST. etc. Although they are essentially simulation schemes which are 
normally discussed without regard to host computer hard,/are, in any actual application, host computer 
hardware will be an important constraint upon the amount of detail which it will be feasible to consider 
with the programs. 
Digital simulation. as opposed to emulation, at the level of gate logic has bcen discussed in the 
literature on computers and considered as a ~ool for design and fault (signature) analyses of di9ital logic 
circuits at levels of detail ranging from simple (e.g .• assuming gates to have only two possible output 
values) to complex (e,9., allowing undefined values of gate outputs and various timing anomal ies) 
(Szygenda. S. and Thompson, E,. 1976). For the analysiS of circuits the sizes of microprocessors. memories 
and largcr. in practice simulation techniques at the ag1regatc. functional behavior level begin to displace 
gate level simulations (r1cnon. P. and ChapIJell. s .. 1977) as the gate level simulation costs become pro-
hibitive t/hen compared to perceived benefits . 
. Hot/ev('r. for the purposes of reliability analysis of' fault tolerant system~, gate levcl simulation 
warrant~, consideraLle coo;t in view of the conclusion to be drawn from the pr(:c~ding paragrdphs th.lt. at 
the levels of reliability of interest. the prlJhability of f,l11ure of such syste",~ is less dependent upon 
the moot: of failure rcsultin~ from depletion of redundant resources than it is upon the less \1ell under-
stood and question~bly landeled modes consirJ(:red under the tenn~ "coverage" and "definitional f1at/s". A 
similar conclusion to thl' effect "th1t lhe introduction of a rcdu:ldanr.y at the hardwdre level incrCJsc5 the 
relative influence of softt/Jre faults" is made elsC</here (Costes, A .• 1978). Unfortunately. while the costs 
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could be suffered, in 1 ight of the t,rnefits, !l,lte level simuLltion Is not a feasitJle technique 1M' aprli-
cdtion to questions involving ch,lIlce events dnd rt"!peilted tl"io\ls because It is time consulIling ,-- orders of 
Rldgnitudt"! slower than likely target systems. 
Emulation vs. Simulation 
In onlinal'y use, the word "emulation" ",Nns an endeavor to equal or excel; In the p.'es~nt context, it 
is reserved for a rarticular technique of imrlementin,) simulation rossible when a host computer Is mlcro-
progrclllUIIJble. In order to avoid confusion, "simulation" acquires the added meaning here of being distinct 
from "emulation". Nicroprograllilling is significant because it allows a final definition of a computer's 
-apparent" instruction set to be postponed until afte.' the definition of hardl'lired logic is completed, 
and it docs this with an accertably small risk th,lt the hJrdl>/,II'e logic will need redesign. This hJPI)ens 
because a "real" Instruction set ,i.i defined by the herd~lired logic, is at a quite primitive level. and is 
tailored especially for executing algol'ithms \'/hich, in ttlrn, become operational definitions of less 
primitive operations -- the "a~parent" instruction set. , 
Thus it may be said that a computer· defined by an "apparent" instruction St't does not really exist; 
it is -emulated" by microprogralilnable hardl>/are by means of microcoded algorithms. Admittedly, variations 
in efficiency of variant microcode operations vis-a-vis various "apparent" instruction sets may exist. but 
they can be ignored for the present purpose. What is notable is that, given reasonable care not to mis-
match host and target computers, microprogralllmable computers can perform in the role of an "apparent" com-
puter approximately as efficiently as a hardwired version of the "apparent" computer ~/Ould. Note that 
-emulation" is at a level of detail which permits software implemented for another, "apparent". target 
computer to be executed "directly" by a host computer. That is, no modification of the target softl>/are is 
needed to make it compatible with the host computer, and no special softl1are on the host computer needs to 
be generated (more specifically, no simulation program in an "apparent" instruction set on the host to 
interpret the instructions of the target software and mimic the target computer) as, would be needed on a 
nonmlcroprogral11llab,le computer. 
Use as a Diagnostic Tool 
Addition of diagnostic, control functions in the microcode permits a host computer to act not only as 
a surrogate but also as a device for observing and reCording (and possibly analyzing) target software per-
formance in an ostensibly natural environment .. Such "diagnostic emulation" use is becoming more COllJllon in 
the development 'and maintenance of special software systems and is, seemingly, "emulation" in the 
dictionary sense. As might be expected efficient use of such a diagnostic system requires support capa-
bilities for readily modifying microcoded algorithms defining target computers. Such facilities are 
beginning to be developed -- for example, EMULAS (Clausen, S, et al •• 1977). What has been less well 
considered is the fact that such capabilities can be extended to permit analysis not only of software but 
also of systems (i.e •• software and hardware) -- and not only as they 'are intended to be but also as they 
are not. By generating the defining microcode such that it represents target computers in sufficiently 
fine detail combinations of failures in individual components. anomalous data. and definitional flaws can 
be introduced and their effects at the system level observed rather than assumed. Thus emulation provides 
a conveniently manipulated failure effects analysis tool. In addition the manner in which an emulation 
technique is iwplemented. with automated diagnostic and system and environment controls. lends itself to 
use for ·pseudo-testing" as in Figure 4. ,-, 
'". In general, emulation can be used to generate repeated trials of "emulated" systems from which 
failure ratios and histograms can be tabulated for analysis -'- hence, aggregate behavior models verified 
and parameter values estimated with some measure of confidence (in a statistical sense). Clearly. assump-
tions about the manners and rates of occurrence of failures and flaws must still be made in order to intro-
duce these last into the emulations. However. while the credibility of precise assumptions will still be 
questionable, it should be possible to develop credibl.l pessimistiC assumptions to attempt to demonstrate 
that particular fault tolerant system designs exceed the reI iabil ity requirement. 
While, also in general, the use of emulation to perform such "pseudo-testing" is 1 imited by the 
efficiency (i.e •• computation speed) of the emulation technique and equipment, it appears reasonable to 
state that It is less restricted than in the case of digital simulation, Given the previously described 
need and difficulty of establishing the reliability of the fault tolerant avionic comruter systems of 
interest. emulation techniques merit further investigation. 
SAMPLE E XPE R IHENT 
Scope 
An effort of limited scale ~Ias undertaken in order to determine whether or not an emulation scheme 
could be devised Hhich ~/ould be sufficiently efficient to support analyses of target systems of meaningful 
sizes and complexities, and to demonstrate that such a scheme could be implemented in a manner convenient 
for analysis purposes by users not well versed. if at all, in the emulation scheme itself. As a demon-
stration, a sample analysis bearing upon reliability of fault tolerant syst~ns was chosen. 
The effort was experimental; time and effort ~lCre expended searching out efficient impl~n(!ntations 
and superior mlcropro,)ramnin,) capabil ities to support the imJll(:mentations. COllsequently no coarnitlllent to 
any specific microprogri)/lililallle h'lrd~/are ~/as desir .. hle initially, The experiment ~/as rerfonned on J large, 
general purpor,e camput.;r ~Iho~e underlying microcode was sacrosanct, For this reason emulution was really 
simulated. This last level of complication can be accounted for by introducing a time scale fuctor; It is 
otherwi<;e i(JlIored here. Hhile sOllie variant efiluldtilJn al(/orithm~ ~/hich have been cnllceived have not yet 
been illlllletllcnted and examined, the effort hdS provided a basi~ for selecting micrClp,'ogrullinallle hard~/are 
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for rurther studies. lI~r·e. hm:c-vc,·. the experiment. is discu~sL'd merely to illustr<lte an actual. r"ther 
than specul~ted. application of onulation to reliability analysiS. 
~!'!!!.la t ior'-le-'l!!!.!..'l.~ 
The scheme selected consists of an algorithll generated independently of any target computer. 
Description~ of particular systems to be t'mulated ,1re provided to the algorithm at the tilHe of operation. 
The methLld is referred to as "table-dl"iven" in contrast to a "compil"tion" method in which J hJrodl'lJre 
description is input to a hilrd\~are descr'iption language "compilero" I~hich generates a colit~JUter program to 
emulate one specifically defined computer. The table-driven method WJS chosen because it was believed to 
facilitate the infusion of failures and to provide better visibility to J user. That is. the target hard-
ware is visible as a distinct entity at e:nulation time rather than being dispersed and buried inside the 
workings of an emulation program. and failures and faults can be added and removed without altering the 
cyclic nature of the algorithm. 
from a user's view~oint. the ~lation is visualized as the repeated transformations of two variables. 
One variable. Sn. describes the structure of the system at time step ~. The variable is essentially a 
matrix which identifies the interconnections among the logiC elements in a systcn,. and also identifies the 
functional behavior of each element. The most primitive element permitted is a generalized gate to which 
constant behavior characteristics (neither correct nor faulty to the emulation algorith:n) are attached. 
More complex elements such as flip-flops and tristate devices are also pennitted, if desired. as primitive 
elements to be manipulated as indivisible entities by the emulation algorithm. (For the experiment. the 
algorithm was limited to elements with scalar output values.) For example. a logic element X might have 
been identified to act as a four (4) input NAND gate driving six (6) other identified elements and supposed 
to have an irregular input-to-output signal propagation time. Hence. Sn _is effectively a time-varying. 
annotated logic diagram. ' 
A second variable. Vn• is a vector containing the output values. at time step ~.- of each of the logic 
elements defined in Sn. Target software corresponds to a subset of this variable. viz •• those values 
corresponding to logic elements defining some of the emulated system's memory.o 
A third auxiliary variable. fn• can be visualized as a source of external perturbations into the 
emulated system -- affecting Sn. Vn• or both. As currently implemented. this variable is generated 
separately from the others in order to increase the speed of the emulation computations. It represents 
the source of random failures. flaws. and anomalies at either preselected or random times and control over 
the emulation process. 
The emulation algorithm. a time invariant transformation. is a collection of techniques (so-called 
·selective trace". linked lists. data compression. parallel processing -- untested because of the limita-
tions of the general computers previously mentioned --. event scheduling) consistent with a model of the 
behavior of a "generalized" logic element over an arbitrary time step. 
SAMPLE ANALYSIS: LATENT FAILURES 
The experimental analysis performed was a study of the efficacy of five (5) particular algorithms. 
each with a different instruction mix. as detectors of component "stuck.-at" faults (i.e .• latent failures) 
in a- particular ·play" system. The analysis is documented in detail in (Nagel. P .• 1978). 
The ·play" target computer was originally generated (i.e .• defined at the gate logic level) as a 
vehicle. for checking out the initial and modified versions of the emulation algorithms. and for demon-
strating the abil ity of support software. a hardware description language translator and meta-assembler 
for regenerating target sofb/are. to respond semiautomatically to harodware design changes. The ·play" 
computer has a memory of 8192. 16 bit I'/ide ~/ords. a CPU \-lith a count of approximately 2000 gate equivalents. 
and a single input-output register/port. The logic is arbitrarily aSSigned to four (4) hypothetical chips: 
a "clock" chip. an "adder~ chip. an "op-decode" chip. and a miscellaneous odds and ends chip. The instruc-
tion set contains about a dozen basic instructions. 
The emulated system trails were simple. The five algorithms. ranging in length from about a dozen 
instructions to several hundreds. were repeatedly executed. with randomly selected initial data. and 
randomly selected faults of random components. Distributions of time from fault occurrence to fault 
detection (i.e .• fault latency duration) ~/ere generated. Two analyses of the sort that would be of 
interest in studies of fault tolerant systems liere made. For one. the observed distributions ~/ere fitted 
against c~nonly used mathematical models. e.g •• exponentials. as would be done in order to determine 
_ models and parameter values for use in reliability analysis programs. The results. of course. are not 
significant. owing to the fanciful nature of the input data; still. it is interesting that the distribu-
tions ~/ere best fit by models of balls selected at random from urns. Another resul t. thot the distribu-
tions each exhibited different nonzero probabilities of never detecting the faults. was predictable. but 
only an experiment of this nature could determine the differences in magnitude. A second effort was a 
search for correlations among the distinguishable characteristics of the algorithms and the distrihutions. 
The only signific~nt correlation found 1'/ilS bell-/een instruction mi~ and detection probi!hility. Here too, 
because of the nature of the target system. the magnitudes of the cOrorelations can only be considered 
fanciful. But the concept is useful in considering characteristics whiCh should be avoided in algorithms 
whose function is to reconfigure a system after a failure has been detected. 
A case has been made for the use of (~nulation techniques as a needed adjunct to reI iabil ity analysis 
models for highly reI iable avionic cOII'puler systc'II1s. Although no conclusion ahout the technique's 
.. 
\ 
3-6-7 
eventual uSI'fulness is yet w,lI·I'Jntcd. in light of its ilppanmt u~(Jrullle$s as J f~i1l1r(' n,()de~ effects 
analysis tool and the pro!lIisc .In<l potenti,ll rCHJrds -of its usc fOI' prob.!bility distdl>ulion uses. fUI·ther 
development dnd invcstigation of the technique appcars w.!rranted and is bt'ing pursued by the NASA. 
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